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Abstract: Companies try to improve risk management in the field of Occupational Health and Safety (OHS). 
In recent years this has translated into the introduction of safety management systems (SMS). These 
management tools bring together personnel, policies and resources aimed at improving the performance of a 
company in the area of OHS. SMS provide a structured, global framework for risk management based on 
compliance with existing repositories. An SMS consists of various stages or processes, notably concerned 
with the management of regulatory compliance and risk analysis. Various tools are deployed in order to meet 
these SMS requirements. 
 
At the same time, the concept of safety culture has progressively taken hold in organizations. The idea has 
numerous benefits and can contribute to a reduction in occupational accidents and illness. However, these 
benefits are presented as self-evident facts which have not really been tested and proven. It is therefore 
appropriate to study the nature and strength of relationships between safety culture and two explanatory 
variables; namely compliance management and risk assessment. In other words, it is necessary to assess the 
respective contributions of these two variables to the creation, deployment and running of safety culture 
within a company. 
 
This paper is organized into three parts. The first part describes the definition of safety culture and looks at 
its various components as described in the literature. The second part presents ways to model the processes 
of regulatory compliance, risk assessment and safety climate and provides a further, descriptive model that 
uses common variables to identify the relationships between these three components in terms of nature and 
degree. Finally, the third section details the results of an experiment carried out in a company. The 
experiment demonstrates the deployment of models to evaluate the interactions between components, and its 
results are discussed and analysed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the domain of Occupational Health and Safety (OHS), companies are constantly striving to improve their 
performance. This has translated into the introduction of Safety Management Systems (SMS). These 
management tools combine people, policies and resources to improve OHS performance. The SMS 
integrates various processes including notably, risk assessment and regulatory compliance. The safety culture 
of the organization also plays an active role in this desire for progress and is oriented towards the perception 
and management of risk by the workforce. It is based on, amongst other things, safety climate analysis tools. 
The results of these assessments provide new, proactive indicators that draw upon human and organizational 
factors. These indicators provide additional data, and raise interesting questions about the nature and degree 
of the relationships between them. 
 
This article looks at the nature of the relationships (should they exist) between the safety climate and two of 
the foundations of risk prevention, namely the management of regulatory compliance and risk management. 
To address the issue, the article is divided into three parts. The first part describes the principle elements of a 
definition of safety culture and looks at its various components. The next section describes the various 
models that have been developed to study these components of safety culture. It also discusses the use of 
common variables to examine the relationships between them. Finally, the third part describes the execution 
of an experiment at a pilot site to investigate in detail the nature and degree of the relationships between the 
different models. 
2.  SAFETY CULTURE, CONCEPTS AND THEORIES 
 
This section describes the principle elements of a definition of safety culture and looks at its various 
components. Each component is described individually in the following sub-sections. 
2.1 Definitions of safety culture 
 
The term ‘safety culture’ emerged following the analysis of two major industrial disasters in the nuclear 
domain, namely Three Mile Island (1979) and Chernobyl (1986). While the Three Mile Island accident 
focused attention on the importance of organizational and human dimensions, it was only following the 
Chernobyl disaster that the term ‘safety culture’ was used for the first time, when it appeared in the accident 
investigation report published in 1987 by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The authors of 
the report, the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), described the concept of ‘safety 
culture’ and put forward the idea that a deficient safety culture was the main reason for the accident. It was 
not until 1991 that INSAG provided a more complete definition of the concept: “Safety Culture is that 
assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an 
overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance.”, 
(INSAG, 1991). 
Since the late 1980s, numerous other definitions of safety culture have been proposed. One of those most 
often cited was provided by the Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (ACSNI) in 
1993, “The safety culture of an organization is the product of individual and group values, attitudes, 
perceptions, competencies and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and 
proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety management.”, (ACSNI, 1993). The definition was later 
adopted by the United Kingdom’s Health and Safety Commission. For authors such as Cooper (Cooper, 
2000) this definition highlights the implicit relationships between psychological, behavioural and 
organizational points of view, based on the following: 
 
- “individual and group values, attitudes…” make it possible to describe the perceptions and attitudes 
of participants towards safety goals (psychological component), 
- “patterns of behavior” refers to the behaviour of individuals on a daily basis (behavioural 
component), 
- “…and the style and proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety management” indirectly 
captures the quality of the Safety Management System (organizational component). 
More recently, using the same line of reasoning, Marcel Simard defines safety culture as, “The set of 
practices developed and implemented by key stakeholders to manage the socio-technical risks of their 
profession.” (Simard, 2009).  The use of the word ‘socio-technical’ encompasses both the technical 
dimension (organizational component) and the human dimension (behavioural and psychological 
components). The term ‘practice’ on the other hand defines both: 
 
- how to act (habitual and accepted behaviour) such as the wearing of personal protective equipment 
(PPE), compliance with the rules, the use of risk analysis; and 
- ways of thinking (values, the importance attached to safety, beliefs, etc.). 
 
These definitions are rooted in earlier work. For example, Cooper’s work (Cooper, 2000) is based on 
amongst others, that of the Canadian psychologist Albert Bandura (Bandura, 1977), which describes the 
relationship between the psychological factors of the individual, their environment and their behaviour. 
2.2 The components of safety culture 
 
Independent of the definition used (INSAG, ACSNI or Simard) safety culture is based on three main 
components (Figure 1), which are behavioural, organizational and psychological. 
 
  
Figure 1. The components of safety culture 
The psychological component aims to analyse the attitudes and perceptions of the individual and the group. 
The behavioural component evaluates external factors (wearing PPE, following operating procedures, etc.) 
applicable to individuals in the field and observable behaviour. Finally, the organizational component 
corresponds to an analysis of business operations through its policies, procedures and structure. Each of these 
components is described below. 
2.2.1. The organisational component 
 
The organizational component refers to the SMS. The SMS is either the product of the companies’ own 
efforts, or is derived from a standardized management system such as those provided by the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) or the Occupational Health and Safety Assessment Series (OHSAS). The various 
frameworks are usually based on a common thread, and their contents are similar despite different names 
(Cambon et al., 2006). Moreover, an analysis of the various requirements of these standards suggests that a 
majority already exist in the French regulatory framework. To illustrate this point, a comparison was made 
between sections of OHSAS 18001 and extracts from French regulations (Table 1). 
Table 1. Comparison of the OHSAS 18001 standard with current French regulations 
 
As Table 1 shows, the main sections of the OHSAS 18001 standard correspond to French regulatory 
requirements. This reflects the fact that (like the OHSAS standard) French regulations simply aim to impose 
best practice and effective prevention measures in order to reduce the occurrence of accidents and 
occupational illness. The important role that the management of regulatory compliance plays in 
Section of OHSAS 
18001 standard 
Equivalent French regulation (examples) Source  
4.3.1 Identifying 
hazards,  risk 
assessment and 
control 
The employer shall maintain a single document containing the results of 
the health and safety risk assessment of workers in accordance with 
Article L. 4121-3. 
This assessment includes an inventory of the risks identified in each 
work unit of the company or institution. 
Article R.4121-1 of 
the French Labour 
Code 
4.4.1 Resources, 
roles, responsibility 
and power 
The employer shall designate one or more competent employees to take 
charge of the company’s protection and occupational risk prevention 
activities. 
Article L.4644-1  
the French Labour 
Code 
4.4.2 Training, 
awareness and 
competence 
When hired and whenever necessary thereafter, the employer shall 
inform the employee of the risks to their health and safety. 
There are more than 420 regulatory requirements related to training or 
mandatory skills in the French regulatory framework. 
Article R.4141-2  
the French Labour 
Code 
4.4.3 
Communication, 
consultation and 
participation 
The employer shall inform each worker of the existence of the workplace 
exposure record. 
More than 100 regulatory requirements related to information and 
training in the French regulatory framework. 
Article R.4452-26  
the French Labour 
Code 
4.4.4 Documentation The employer shall record in a single document the results of the 
occupational risk assessment 
More than 520 regulatory requirements related to documentation in 
the French regulatory framework. 
Article R.4121-1  
the French Labour 
Code 
organizational components (policy, procedures, communication, etc.), leads to an analysis of this component 
based primarily on the regulations in force. 
2.2.2. The behavioural component 
 
The behavioural component includes factors external to individuals in the field and observable behaviour. It 
therefore involves implementing an analytical model based on the reality on the ground found in the various 
workstations. This model was inspired by the methodologies required by the French regulatory framework 
for assessing occupational risk in the workplace. The objective of the risk assessment is that it should be, “a 
prerequisite for the definition of prevention actions based on an upstream knowledge of the risks that the 
workforce may be exposed to. It aims to improve health and safety protection for employees and to improve 
working conditions within the company. As a result, the need for prevention also contributes to improving 
the overall performance of the company, from both a social and an economic point of view.”(French 
Circular
1
). The importance of risk assessment in the behavioural analysis of individuals leads to the design of 
a model for the analysis of the behavioural component based on the results of an occupational risk 
assessment. 
2.2.3. The psychological component 
 
The psychological component refers to what the individual thinks. It concerns their opinions, beliefs, 
perceptions, attitudes and values. This component can be measured by interviews and/or tailored 
questionnaires. Various questionnaires exist on the topic of ‘safety climate’; they investigate notably, 
perceptions of commitment to health and safety, job satisfaction, communication, personal perceptions of 
involvement in health and safety, etc. Studies conducted by Guldenmund (Guldenmund, 2000) and the 
United Kingdom’s Health and Safety Executive (HSE, 1999) have demonstrated that safety culture is often 
only considered under the heading of the psychological component in questionnaires and/or interviews. 
However, the representation of safety culture shown in Figure 1 shows rather that all three components are 
connected to each other and that together they form a platform for safety culture. It is therefore necessary to 
analyse all three components in order to properly characterize the safety culture of an organization. 
 
This second section has briefly outlined the components of safety culture. The next step is to consider the 
following questions: how to approach the analysis of these various components of safety culture? What are 
the relationships between the different components? What contribution do basic components such as 
regulatory compliance and risk assessment make to the creation of a safety culture? What contribution do 
these elements make to the analysis and improvement of safety culture? Section 3 will address these 
questions. 
3. MODELLING SAFETY CULTURE 
 
In order to examine the relations between the components of safety culture, the components must be 
modelled using a set of descriptive and explanatory variables that can be linked. These variables were 
modelled independently for each of the three components. Models were developed for: the management of 
regulatory compliance, risk management and safety climate. A class diagram was created to describe the 
processes occurring in each model. Using this Unified Modelling Language (UML) diagram, the data 
structure for each class and the relationships between them (dependencies, composition, aggregations) can be 
explained. Each individual model, part of a system of models, is described below. 
3.1. Modelling the organizational component 
 
The organizational component of safety culture is examined here through the management of regulatory 
compliance. The model (Figure 2) shows the interactions between different actors with the regulatory 
compliance assessment model in place. It is based on the modelling work of Juglaret (Juglaret et al., 2011a). 
                                                     
1
 French circular DRT n° 2002-06 (18 april 2002)  
 
 Figure 2. Model of regulatory compliance management  
The model divides the organization into entities and units. Next, the selected units are associated with the 
various regulatory themes. Themes are selected from French regulatory framework (in particular the Labour 
Code). They include risk-bearing activities (for example resulting from chemical or biological hazards, or 
materials handling), infrastructure (fire, evacuation, etc.) and regulations related to personnel (employment 
contracts etc.). An analysis of the relevant texts makes it possible to summarise the regulatory requirements 
underlying each theme. The requirements’ summary includes points such as the date they entered into force, 
how often they should be applied, management principles, etc. The results of this assessment provide input to 
an action plan and specialized analytic reports. The fact that some of the variables are also found in the other 
two models (e.g. management principles or risk family) enables a crossover study to be made with them (this 
is described in detail in section 3.4). 
3.2. Modelling the behavioural component 
 
This model (Figure 3) shows both the interactions between actors and the contents of the risk management 
model. It is based on the work of Juglaret (Juglaret et al., 2011b). 
 
 
Figure 3. Model of risk assessment management 
 
This risk assessment model divides the company into work units (or workstations). For each work unit the 
employee defines the principle tasks and hazardous situations. Risks arising from these hazardous situations 
are evaluated by the employee using a tailored analysis grid that takes into account the likelihood of 
occurrence and severity of the risk. Once the preventive measures used currently used by the employee have 
been listed, the model makes it possible, if necessary, to add new measures to be implemented. These 
measures provide input to an action plan. This global analysis of the workstation provides detailed reporting. 
3.3. Modelling the psychological component 
 
This model (Figure 4) shows the contents of the safety climate model. The safety climate is a snapshot of the 
psychological component of the workforce at a given time (Flin et al., 2000). 
 
 
Figure 4. Model of safety climate management 
The safety climate assessment model is based on the major themes common to safety climate questionnaires 
(Guldenmund, 2007). These questionnaires typically cover various management principles but also ask for 
the views of employees on the different risk families. All employees that participate in the survey respond 
individually to the questionnaire. Questionnaires use a Likert scale to capture opinions on topics such as the 
perception of commitment to health and safety, job satisfaction, communication, perceptions of personal 
involvement in health and safety, etc. The construction of the model evaluation of safety climate is described 
in an internal document (MinesParistech, 2012) The results of the survey provide input to reports and 
specialized action plans. 
3.4. Interrelations between the three models 
 
Sections 3.1 to 3.3 have outlined the models used to describe the three components of safety culture. In order 
to investigate the relations between them, the management principles of each model were integrated. As can 
be seen in Figures 2, 3 and 4, the following management principles have been added: 
- for the regulatory compliance model: each of the regulatory requirements, 
- for the risk assessment model: existing prevention measures and measures to be implemented, and 
- for the safety climate model: the questionnaire. 
Table 2 highlights the management principles found in the three safety culture models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2. Management principles and safety culture models 
 
The fact some management principles are found in all three models is a good demonstration that 
relationships exist between them. Some principles are only present in one or two models; the particular 
characteristics of the other models make it impossible to examine the principle. Therefore, these principles 
are only used in the detailed analysis of the results of the model they appear in, and are not taken account in 
the examination of interrelations. 
 
Using the same methodology, the principal risk families were integrated into the models: 
- for the regulatory compliance model: on each of the regulatory requirements, 
- risk families were already present in the occupational risk assessment model, and 
- as part of the safety climate questionnaire: in the assessment of the views of employees of each risk 
family. 
Table 3 highlights the risk families found in each model. 
Table 3. Risk family analysis and safety culture models  
 
Management principle Regulatory compliance Risk assessment Safety climate 
Analysis X X X 
Training and information X X X 
Design and layout of the workplace X X X 
Operational management X X X 
Document management X X X 
Personal protection equipment X X X 
Management X  X 
Periodic checks and controls X   
Emergency procedures and intervention methods X   
Design and layout of workstations X   
Risk family Regulatory 
compliance 
Risk assessment Safety climate 
Mechanical X X X 
Chemical X X X 
Business trip X X X 
Explosion X X X 
Temporary work at height X X X 
Materials handling X X X 
Radiation X X X 
Electrical X X X 
Fire X X X 
Working environment X X X 
Physical activity/posture and 
movement 
X X  
Stress and psychosocial risks X  X 
Management X   
Employment contract X   
Workplace design X   
Safety authorities X   
Employer’s responsibilities X   
Category of employee X   
Addictive practices X   
Workplace environment  X  
Visual constraints  X  
As several risk families feature in several models it once again demonstrates that relationships exist between 
them. Some risk families are only present in one or two models; as above, the characteristics of the other 
models make it impossible to analyse them. As with management principles, these risk families are used in 
the detailed analysis of the results of the model they appear in, but are not taken into account in the 
examination of interrelations. 
 
This crossover study of variables at the level of management principles and risk families provides a good 
demonstration of the relationships between the components of safety culture. Despite the fact that each 
model has a different purpose, it is possible to link them together through the use of specific variables. It 
remains to characterize the nature and degree of the relationships between models; this is achieved through a 
field experiment. 
4.  A CASE STUDY 
 
This section describes the implementation of an experiment carried out in partnership with a major French 
company. It discusses the pilot site, the on-site deployment and the initial results. 
4.1 The pilot site 
 
The pilot site carries out research and innovation in the cosmetics field. It has been operating since 1953 and 
employs around 1,000 staff. There are two main divisions: the International Directorate General of 
Cosmetics and International General Directorate of Hair. Each division is organized into different branches. 
 4.2 Methodology 
 
The experiment was conducted in three main phases: preparation, on-site execution and analysis and 
evaluation. These three phases are composed of eight interrelated tasks shown in Figure 5: 
 
 
Figure 5. Structure of the experiment showing the eight tasks organized into three phases  
 4.3 Results and discussion 
 
Using the defined methodologies and the experimental methodology, an investigation into the nature and 
degree of the interrelationships between the three individual models was carried out. The models deployed at 
the pilot site were used to assess the level of understanding of each management principle (on a scale of 0 to 
100).  Figure 6 shows the consolidated results. 
 
 Figure 6. Level of understanding of management principles common to the three models 
The radar chart shows that an analysis of the same management principle, at the same site using different 
models does not produce quite the same results. For example, the ‘personal protection’ principle has a level 
of understanding of over 90% using the regulatory compliance model, while the risk assessment and safety 
climate models evaluate the level of understanding to be 60%. An analysis of this field experiment suggests 
that this result is explained by the fact that regulatory compliance is evaluated more broadly than risk 
assessment and safety climate. While in general the site meets the majority of regulatory requirements, the 
specifics of the situation in the field tell a different story. The risk assessment and safety climate models 
examine the behaviour and the views of employees more closely, and provide a more detailed picture of 
factors related to personal protection. In this case, it was shown that although the company had all the 
necessary measures in place to comply with regulatory requirements, in practice employees were not 
applying all the rules. 
 
Another radar chart was produced from data measuring the level of understanding of the various risk families 
according to the model used (Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7. Level of understanding of each risk family common to the three models 
 
As in Figure 6, the compliance model has an overall higher level of understanding than the risk assessment 
and safety climate models. It should be noted here that this article will not discuss the results of individual 
risk families. 
 
Figures 6 and 7 show that, by means of common variables, the three models can be compared. These charts 
provide new indicators and Scorecards that can be used to improve OHS performance measurement (Juglaret 
et al., 2011c). The use of a radar chart is not intended to highlight the effectiveness of one model compared 
to another. Rather, it shows that each of the models can be used to examine the same variable from a 
different angle and can highlight points that are not apparent in the other models. To obtain a relevant 
indicator for a variable, an interesting approach is to deploy each of the three models; this provides a 
complete overview of the variable. Going beyond the current analysis, which looks at the different results 
obtained depending on the model used, it would also be interesting to carry out a detailed mathematical study 
to determine whether the variables used are independent (or not). This work is in progress. 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The discussion of the safety culture concept in Section 2 assumes that it is based on three components, 
namely psychology, behaviour and organization. In practice, it turns out that an assessment of safety culture 
is based primarily on the psychological component. The question that arises from this observation is why the 
other components are either hardly, or not at all taken into account. Are there any links between these 
different components? If these components are integrated into the safety culture assessment, what 
contribution do they make to the construction of a safety culture? These questions led to the implementation 
of an experiment designed to address the hypotheses (described in Section 4). Section 3 explained the 
methodological approach for the characterization of the models deployed. Variables common to all three 
models, such as management principles and risk families were used to link them together. The results of the 
experiment described in Section 4 would be enriched by a detailed mathematical investigation of the 
correlations between models (e.g. factor analysis) to establish whether the common variables are independent 
(or not). An analysis of these results will better characterize the nature and degree of the interrelationships 
between the components of safety culture. After reviewing the results of this model it will be interesting to 
expand this research by other approaches to assessment of safety culture such as the organisational 
management of uncertainty for example. (Grote, 2007). 
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